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NOTES
BENRUS WATCH CO v. KIRSCH
The decision in Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch . represents judi-
cial recognition of an apparently unintended repeal by implication
of the Virginia Fair Trade Act.2 In order to explain this conclusion
it will be necessary to briefly review the recent history of the so-
called "fair trade" laws, the relationship of the Federal and State
laws in the field and the nature of the legislative action which laid
the foundation for the decision.
Fair trade laws were apparently products of the economic
depression period of the 1930's. They are, in essence, statutory
sanctions of resale price maintenance-the fixing of the retail
price of various brand-identified products by means of contractual
agreements between parties at different levels in the vertical chain
of distribution. These laws include a controversial and essential
feature which is known appropriately as the "non-signer" clause.'
By means of these "non-signer" provisions the fair trade agreement
is made binding upon third persons, not parties to the agreement,
who have knowledge of its existence. For example, an agreement
between a wholesaler and a retailer as to the resale price of a
particular article can theoretically bind the retail trade of an
entire jurisdiction by means of the civil right of action created in
the original parties against third persons who wilfully and know-
ingly sell the subject article at less than the agreed price.4
Obviously this legislation provides for and sanctions a practice,
i. e., combinations of persons to fix prices, which is directly in con-
flict with the theory, and the usual express provisions, of anti-
monopoly legislation.5 As a consequence, its survival has had to be
assured by the action of state and federal legislative bodies in pro-
1 198 Va. 94, 92 S.E.2d 384 (1956). And see 42 Va.L.Rev. 996 (1957).
2 Va. Code §§59-1 to 59-8 (1950).
3 Va. Code §59-7 (1950).
4 The principal case involved an action under the Virginia statute brought
by a manufacturer against a non-signing, non-complying retailer.
See Va. Code §59-20 (1950).
viding statutory immunity from the operation of their respective
anti-monopoly laws.
6
The Federal statutes, which were enacted in order to exempt
"fair trade" practices from the operation of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act and to make state laws applicable to goods moving in
interstate commerce, are so worded that they authorize the appli-
cation of "fair trade" principles to certain classes of goods moving
in interstate commerce where the state involved has itself au-
thorized such practices. The Virginia procedure was to provide a
saving clause in its Anti-Monopoly Act which exempted from the
operation of that Act those practices which could meet the test
prescribed by the laws of the United States.7 Thus "fair trade,"
being permissible on a national level, became permissible in Vir-
ginia.
In 1950 the General Assembly re-enacted and amended a part
of the Anti-Monopoly Act, and for our purposes, accomplished two
things: first, the enactment date of the Anti-Monopoly Act was
thereby made more recent than that of the Fair Trade Act, and,
second, the italicized words were removed from Section 59-40 of
the Anti-Monopoly Act which had previously read as follows:8
This chapter shall apply to those trusts, combinations and
monopolies which are unreasonable or inimical to the
public welfare, as hereinbefore defined and are prohibited
and penalized under the provisions of any law of the
United States or would be prohibited and penalized under
the provisions of any law of the United States if their ac-
tivities extended to interstate as well as intrastate com-
merce.
6See Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C. §1; McGuire Act
of 1952, 66 Stat. 632, 15 U.S.C. §45; Va. Code §§59-1 to 59-40
(1950). It should be noted that an effort is made to preserve the tra-
ditional element of competition by the stipulation that, in order to be
eligible to be "fair traded", goods must be in free and open competi-
tion with other goods of the same general class produced and distributed
by others. The question of whether or not this provision is effective in
assuring the public of the benefits of competitive pricing is the subject
of much debate.
7 Va. Code §59-40 (1950).
8 Prior to the 1950 amendment, this section had been interpreted as limiting
the effect of the Anti-Monopoly Act to those trusts and monopolies
which would be prohibited or penalized under any law of the United
States if their activities extended to interstate commerce. Werth v. Fire
Companies Adjustment Bureau, 160 Va. 845, 171 S.E. 255 (1933).
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As thus amended, this Section no longer provides protection
for any activity clearly described by the express provisions of the
Anti-Monopoly Act. In the principal case, the court recognized the
direct conflict between the provisions of the two acts9 and, apply-
ing an established rule of law," held that the Fair Trade Act had
been repealed by implication.
Upon first examination it appears that the cause and effect in
this case are so logically interrelated that the only reasonable con-
clusion to be drawn is that the amendment of 1950 was made with
the deliberate intention of bringing about the repeal of the Fair
Trade Act. Further study has revealed that "fair trade" was not
merely actively shielded by the repealed saving clause, supra.
In February of 1950 the state was faced with a prospective
telephone employees strike. The Governor had seized the city
transit lines in Richmond, Norfolk and Portsmouth as a result of a
labor dispute. A widespread coal miners strike had resulted in an
increasingly critical fuel shortage in Virginia and in well publicized
violence in the mining areas of the western part of the State. As a
consequence, anti-labor feeling was running high and a series of bills
having to do with labor matters was introduced in the General
Assembly. Among these, newspaper accounts briefly refer to a bill
(House Bill 588) intended to make labor unions subject to the Anti-
Monopoly Act. In order to accomplish this it was necessary to
eliminate Section 59-30 of that Act which was another saving
clause expressly exempting labor unions, among other groups, from
the restrictions to the parent act. This alone would not have been
sufficient, however, to accomplish the desired result inasmuch as
Section 59-40 with its broad savings clause would have precluded
action under the Act against any practice sanctioned by the liberal
Federal labor laws. 1' Both of these ends were accomplished by the
previously discussed amendment of 195012 which had as its origin
House Bill 588.
9 Compare the sanctions of the Fair Trade Act with the express prohibitions
of §59-20.
10 Norfolk & W.R.Co. v. Virginian R. Co., 110 Va. 631, 66 S.E. 863
(1910); Gaskill v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 440, 39 S.E.2d 296 (1946).
"See the provisions of this section which have been transcribed in the body
of this article.
12 Acts of Assembly, 1950, Ch. 396, p. 703.
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These circumstances, and the absence of any contemporary
newspaper accounts mentioning the normally controversial subject
of "fair trade" in connection with this proposed legislation, lead
to the conclusion that the legislators did not intend a repeal of the
Fair Trade Act and that the consumer public has been the recipient
of a "windfall."
At this point, it seems appropriate to speculate as to the pros-
pects for reenactment of the Fair Trade Act and its prospects for
survival in the courts if reenacted.
As indicated, these laws appear to have been products of the
depression period of the 1930's. Then and now they seem to be in-
tended to benefit a limited, although numerous, class of business
enterprises. Indirect benefits to the consumer public are claimed by
the proponents, but it seems to be the consensus of non-partisan
opinion that the consumer carries the burden in the form of higher
than necessary prices. In practice the theoretical benefits to certain
business elements have been severely curtailed by difficulties of
enforcement and other malfunctions in the system.:23 As a result
only a limited number of the theoretical beneficiaries are strongly in
favor of "fair trade" as a practical matter. Despite this, those
elements which do benefit are ardent in their demands for "fair
trade" assistance from the legislatures and a local member of such a
retailer's association has indicated that that group"4 will sponsor a
new bill in the next session of the General Assembly. The prospects
for the enactment of such a bill appear to depend upon whether
the change in business conditions plus the factor of lessened
business support can overcome the advantage which aggressive spe-
cial interest groups have often held over the anonymous consumer.
If "fair trade" makes a comeback, it is likely to be subjected
to a prompt test on constitutional grounds. Since 1952 a large num-
ber of state "fair trade" acts have been so challenged and, accord-
ing to a trade paper,' 5 roughly fifty percent of those so tested have
been held to be unconstitutional under state constitutions. The
usual attack seems to be based upon the theory that various con-
stitutional rights have been encroached upon by an unwarranted
'2 See: Herman, A Note on Fair Trade, 65 Yale L.J. 23 (1955); Note, 69
Harv. L.Rev. 316 (1955).
'1 Retail Druggists Association.
Is Drug Topics, issue of about April 30, 1957.
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exercise of the police power. The principal case included such an
attack, and, in the trial court, the decision was based on that point
alone. The appellate court found it unnecessary to decide the point,
but did refer to the "very serious" nature of the question raised as
measured by the Virginia Constitution and cases interpreting it.
The case specifically referred to was decided in 190316 and applied
a strict "public health, safety and morals"'" test to limit the exer-
cise of the State's police power and to invalidate a statute prohib-
iting the use of the now notorious trading stamp in retail sales. Sub-
sequent cases indicate a much broader interpretation of the proper
scope of the police power.' 8 The key words now seem to be "public
welfare," and the courts are free to uphold a much wider exercise
of the police power. The economic difficulties of the times doubtless
were responsible for the advent of more liberal views in the 1930's,
and it seems logical to assume that, in any contest of this right of
the state to promote the public welfare to the detriment of the
individual rights, it is going to be necessary for the court to make its
decision as to the propriety of any particular form of state action in
the light of existing circumstances.' 9 What was appropriate in the
19 3 0's could well be found to be unwarranted interference with the
rights of the individual during the current days of prosperity. Inci-
dentally, there appear to have been no appellate level tests of the
Fair Trade Act prior to the principal case, and there are, accord-
ingly, no bases for speculation which are directly in point.
Despite the changed economic conditions, one element which
may be decisive in a future test of "fair trade" is the policy of the
court to uphold the considered acts of the legislature in doubtful
cases unless the action which has been taken is clearly unconstitu-
16 Young v. Commonwealth, 101 Va. 853, 45 S.E. 327 (1903).
:7 "It follows therefore, that, unless the statute in question is one which in
some way provides for the public safety, pertains to the public health,
or concerns the public morals, it is not a valid exercise of the police
power." Young v. Commonwealth, 101 Va. 853, 863, 45 S.E. 327, 329
(1903).
18 Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S.E. 914 (1926); West Bros. Brick Co.
v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302
U.S. 658, 58 S.Ct. 369, 82 L.Ed. 508 (1937); Sanitation Comm. v.
Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 87 S.E.2d 153 (1955).
19 "General welfare can no more be defined than can police power. These
are terms which take on new definitions when we come to face new
conditions. General welfare in Alexandria today may warrant regula-
tions which would have been fantastic in Sherwood Forest." West Bros.
Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 288, 192 S.E. 881, 888 (1937).
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tional.2 0 With this in mind, it does not seem unreasonable to con-
clude that, if the special interest groups secure the enactment of
"fair trade" legislation, the court must give considerable weight to
the legislative decision as to what is in the best interest of the public.
The fact that the greatest theoretical benefit from these laws runs
to the small, local businessman, 21 of whom there are many, cer-
tainly would lend plausibility to such a decision on the part of the
legislature.
To summarize, it would appear that the principal case did not
conclusively decide the future status of "fair trade" in Virginia;
that enactment of replacement legislation is quite possible and
that, if enacted, there is only a prospect that the courts will find it





NUNC PRO TUNC ORDERS IN VIRGINIA
What began in England over six-hundred years ago ' as a
simple correction of a one-letter or one syllable error, judgment
nunc pro tunc, has evolved into a modern-day tool of unforseen pos-
sibility of both justice and injustice. Virginia, by its decision in
Council v. Commonwealth 2 has joined the states who are firmly
committed to the course of adding to the tangled mass of progeny
the rule has begotten since its inception in the days of Edward III.
20 Almond v. Gilmer, 188 Va. 822, 51 S.E.2d 272 (1949); City of Newport
News v. Elizabeth City County, 189 Va. 825, 55 S.E.2d 56 (1949);
Sanitation Comm. v. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 87 S.E.2d 153 (1955).
21 Where effective the agreements fix the resale price at a level at which the
smaller, less efficient seller can make a comfortable profit and, at the
same time, the efficient, large volume seller is precluded from gaining
a competitive advantage by reducing his price.
22 "Equality and rights of men.-That men are by nature equally free and
independent and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they
enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or
divest their posterity, namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and ob-
taining happiness and safety."
1 14 Edw. III, Chap. 6.
2 198 Va. 288, 94 S.E.2d 245 (1956).
